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"ALL HIS WANTS SHOULD BE 
PROMPTLY SUPPLIED”: 
 
PERSIFOR F. SMITH AND THE CALOOSAHATCHEE RIVER 
 
CAMPAIGN OF 1837-38 
 
By Joe Knetsch 
 
Writing on December 28, 1837, the 
"Maligned General," Thomas Sidney Jesup 
ordered Major I. B. Brant, Quarter Master at 
Tampa to take every measure possible to 
keep the Louisiana Volunteers in good 
supply. In his order he noted: 
 
General Smith reports that he will have 
eight hundred men in the field, and will 
not have transportation for more than 
half his force. His operations, from his 
proximity to Holatoochee, will be more 
important upon the results of the 
campaign, perhaps, than those of any 
other commander: All his wants should 
be promptly supplied. The failure of his 
column from want of transportation, or 
from any other cause, would be most 
disastrous, and might lead to the failure 
of every other column.1 
 
In Jesup’s plan of operation, access to the 
west coast of Florida and the area approach-
ing the Big Cypress Swamp had to be denied 
to the Seminoles and their allies. It was the 
job of Persifor Smith and his command to 
stop the Indians from reaching these desti-
nations. It was a crucial role in the complex 
operations of the United States Army against 
the Indians of Florida and one that Smith 
was quite capable of performing to Jesup’s 
satisfaction. 
 
Persifor Frazer Smith was born in 
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania in 1798 and later 
graduated from the College of New Jersey 
(now Princeton) in 1815. He took up the 
study of the law while at school and moved 
to New Orleans in 1819. Smith quickly 
made his mark in the rough and tumble town 
and rose rapidly in its politics.2 He married 
into the family of the prominent Francois 
Bureau, taking Bureau’s daughter, Francis 
Jeanette, as his wife. He also became very 
active in local militia matters, rising to 
command of a battalion in a few short years. 
In 1834, his strong political ally, Edward 
Persifor F. Smith in 1848 
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Douglass White, became Louisiana’s first 
Whig governor and appointed Smith to the 
post of adjutant general in the following 
year. With his political and military 
connections in place, Smith soon received 
the news of the outbreak of hostilities in 
Florida and was in a position to come to the 
aid of the Territory when General Edmund 
P. Gaines requested such in early 1836.3 
 
Dr. Canter Brown, Jr. has recently shown 
the importance of Smith’s role in the 1836 
campaign. Brown has also noted the 
difficulties that Smith encountered in raising 
the first force of volunteers, including 
getting White to help gather the funds for 
the thirty dollar per man bounty. The 
internal politics of this command, well 
documented by Brown, show the tense 
situation in New Orleans. These included 
having White turn down a request by his 
rival for governor, Major General John B. 
Dawson, to lead the volunteers in Florida. 
The governor got around the seniority of 
Dawson by politely noting that the call for 
troops from General Gaines was for a 
colonel’s command, eight companies, and as 
Dawson insisted upon maintaining his rank, 
the request was denied in favor of Smith. 
Soon thereafter, Persifor Smith led the 
volunteers upon the perilous voyage to 
Tampa to begin their service.4 
 
Smith’s troops served with valor and 
distinction during their tenure in Florida. 
They suffered many of the hardships of 
army life on the frontier, including bad food, 
mosquitoes, worn out clothes and shoes and 
impossible country for campaigning. Their 
Peace River expedition was difficult and 
without many positive results, except the 
exploration of about fifty-two miles of new 
territory, before the food ran out and they 
were forced to return to Charlotte Harbor. 
The volunteers returned to Fort Brooke on 
April 25, 1836, where they were greeted by 
orders for their departure back to Louisiana, 
thus ending their brief, but difficult service.5 
 
The performance of the Louisiana 
volunteers under Smith’s leadership was 
outstanding and widely recognized in the 
ranks of the regular army, something highly 
unusual in a war where volunteers were 
normally considered second-rate soldiers at 
best. In late July of the following year, 
Smith, again, offered to lead Louisiana’s 
volunteers into the field in Florida. This time 
the command of the regular army was in the 
hands of Major General Jesup, someone 
who knew about Smith’s capabilities. As he 
noted to Secretary of War Joel Poinsett: 
 
Sir: I enclose a copy of a letter received 
today from General P. E Smith, of 
Louisiana. The general commanded a 
regiment under General Scott and Gen-
eral Gaines in the first campaign, not 
only with credit, but with distinction. If 
he could bring a regiment of infantry 
into the field- and I have no doubt of his 
ability to do so- the service would be 
greatly benefitted. By adding to his 
regiment a small body of regular troops 
he would be able, with naval 
co-operation, to commence his 
operations at Charlotte Harbor, or 
further south, and destroy or drive out 
the parties of Indians in the southern 
portion of the peninsula. . . . I consider it 
of the utmost importance that a regiment 
should be obtained from Louisiana, and 
of equal importance that General Smith 
should command it.6 
 
But, this time, the terms of the service would 
have to be different. As Smith noted in his 
letter of July 30, 1837, to Jesup: "The 
regiment I commanded in 1836 left the ser-
vice of the United States highly and justly 
discontented with it. They had served the 
whole time faithfully; indeed, had passed it 
nearly two weeks, had been the whole time 
in constant activity, and when they arrived 
here, in rags and poverty, found not the 
slightest preparation on the part of the 
government to pay them off, 
notwithstanding the most positive orders on 
the part of General Scott." The governor of 
the state, Smith reminded Jesup, actually 
had to borrow money to pay the command. 
The army paymaster, who was supposed to 
have reimbursed the men for expenses, was, 
in one last bit of frustration for the 
volunteers, remanded to Alabama and was 
not on hand in time to perform the required 
duty. Yet, Smith stated hopefully, a year had 
passed since this ugly incident and it was 
probable that he could raise the troops Jesup 
needed for his Florida campaign.7 
 
Two of the major reasons for Jesup’s 
enthusiasm for Smith’s Louisiana volunteers 
were their proximity, compared to Kentucky 
or Tennessee, and the fact they came from 
an area with a more similar climate.8 
Another factor which weighed heavily upon 
the reasoning of Joel Poinsett was the very 
cumbersome arrangements necessary to 
properly staff a volunteer unit, especially 
under an inexperienced commanding officer. 
Smith, having proven himself an able and 
willing administrator, would be able to 
avoid most of the petty grievances 
frequently voiced by elected volunteer 
leaders. Also, the expense and time spent in 
gathering a new force would be greatly 
reduced with Smith in charge of the 
operation.9 Taken altogether, Persifor Smith 
was the ideal candidate to lead a major 
volunteer force when combined with regular 
troops against the stubborn foe. 
 
After looking into business affairs in 
Philadelphia during most of September, 
Smith returned to New Orleans where his 
junior officers were already raising the 
required force.10 By November 2, 1837, 
Persifor Smith and the Louisiana volunteers 
had left New Orleans, bound for Tampa. 
There he was supposed to meet with five 
companies of Philadelphia troops and units 
of the 2nd Infantry to outfit and get supplies 
for their trip to the Caloosahatchee country. 
The force from Louisiana was about two 
hundred and fifty men.11 The Philadelphia 
force raised was to be about five hundred 
men, which, as noted earlier, meant that 
when Smith was ready to embark from 
Tampa, his force would number about eight 
hundred men.12 
 
Smith’s force was to be but one element in a 
much larger, more elaborate plan than any 
yet attempted in Florida. Jesup’s plan was 
very involved and set into motion as many 
as nine different columns at one time.13 The 
main thrust of the plan, however, involved 
four columns, each entering the southern 
end of the peninsula from different routes, 
driving the Indians into the center of the 
Everglades and isolating them from any 
chance for outside assistance. Through 
constant campaigning and pressure on the 
food supply, Jesup hoped to end the war by 
March or April of 1838. To do this 
effectively would require that his forces 
would be in the field by no later than 
October. This hope was not to be. As the 
master planner stated: 
 
I had desired to commence operations on 
the 1st of October, because, at that time, 
the St. John is navigable a greater 
distance that at a later period; and I 
could avail myself of more than two 
months of the services of the Florida 
troops, whose term of service expired in 
December. The regular troops, however, 
did not begin to arrive until near the last 
of October, and they continued to come 
in until December. The principal 
volunteer force arrived about the 1st of 
December.14 
The late arrivals of the various forces meant 
that the campaign started later in the dry 
season and would have to end before the 
beginning of the rainy season. The tatter 
meant sickness, death and impossible 
conditions for a campaign against the 
Indians. 
 
While Jesup, himself, led forces up the St. 
Johns River from Fort Mellon, General 
Joseph Hernandez and his Florida militia 
would scour the area between the St. Johns 
and the Atlantic coast. As the distance 
between these two forces narrowed, the 
Alabama and Tennessee volunteers and 
others joined with Hernandez’s column and 
attempted to push the enemy further into the 
Everglades and deny them the coast. The 
movement of these troops led to the 
foundation of a number of establishments, 
namely Forts Pierce, Jupiter, Lauderdale, 
Christmas and Bankhead on Key Biscayne.15 
 
Just as important to the overall success of 
the campaign were the western columns, 
outfitted and embarking from Tampa. As 
Jesup described the first of these: "General 
Taylor was directed to proceed from Tampa 
Bay, open a road in nearly an eastern 
direction into the heart of the country, 
establish a post on the head of Peas creek, 
another on the Kissimmee, and attack the 
enemy in that quarter."16 This he did with 
his actions culminating in the Battle of Lake 
Okeechobee, fought on Christmas Day 
1837. The other column, was to rendezvous 
in Tampa and enter the field through the 
Caloosahatchee River. The operations of this 
column covered the whole country from 
Fisheating Creek, which enters Lake 
Okeechobee from the west, to Cape Sable, 
where forces under Colonel Thomas Lawson 
established Fort Poinsett. This column’s 
activities resulted in the establishment of 
Forts Deynaud, Center and Keais 
(pronounced Keys) and the eventual capture 
of two hundred and forty three prisoners.17 
 
Each of these two columns had specific 
assignments. Smith’s was to deny the enemy 
access to the coast and the Big Cypress 
Swamp. The former because of the potential 
for gaining arms and supplies and the latter 
because it was known to be an impossible 
area in which to successfully campaign. 
Also of importance, was the need to keep 
the Indians south of the settlements and 
away from their brethren further north. 
Taylor’s troops were to swing around to the 
east of the big lake and, after establishing 
Forts Basinger and McCrea, close off any 
communication with the north via the 
Kissimmee River valley or the reaches of 
the upper St. Johns River. With the constant 
movement of troops from the coastal forts, 
like Fort Lauderdale, Poinsett, Dallas and 
Jupiter, pushing inland, attacking the 
Seminoles and their allies on the "islands" of 
the Everglades and denying the enemy the 
"coontie" grounds in southeastern Florida, 
Jesup felt confident that his campaign would 
have very positive results in ending the 
war.18 The total force at his command, by 
January of 1838, was 8,993; 4,637 regulars, 
4,078 volunteers, 109 seamen and 178 
Indians.19 All of this depended not only on 
the valor of the troops, but the reliable 
delivery of supplies and arms. 
 
The supply problem for such a large 
undertaking as this campaign was enormous. 
The proper boats had to be ordered from 
Philadelphia and New York; specially 
designed steamboats had to be constructed 
to accommodate Florida’s shallow waters; 
pontooniers had to be organized and 
assembled; boatbuilders had to be on hand 
for special needs; great quantities of forage 
and food had to be advanced to the fighting 
stations; articles for the construction of the 
frontier fortifications had to be obtained and 
forwarded to the troops; necessary animals 
had to be procured for the mounted troops 
and wagon-masters; huge numbers of rations 
had to be prepared in advance; medical 
supplies had to be assembled, along with 
obtaining the medical officers, regular and 
volunteer, to use them properly; tents, 
shovels, canteens, belts, caps, etc. all had to 
be ordered, assembled, shipped and 
forwarded to the front lines of four major 
columns. The tasks were daunting and 
complicated in the extreme. In a lengthy 
memorandum to Major Collins, Jesup listed 
the articles needed for an "advanced Depot": 
400 blankets for packsaddles, 6 crosscut 
saws, 200 pounds of spikes, 2,000 
horseshoes with nails, 400 cast steel axes, 20 
froes, 20 Broad axes, 3 complete sets of 
blacksmith’s tools, 20 coils of rope for 
packing, 800 packing bags, 2,000 pounds of 
iron, pitch for boats. Many other “essential" 
items that the average "advanced Depot" 
would need to supply the troops in the field 
could be listed from the above 
memorandum, however, those materials 
listed will suffice for demonstration 
purposes.20 The logistics of this campaign in 
the swamps of Florida were difficult, 
complex and, in the end, highly frustrating 
to the clever general. 
 
As noted earlier, Smith's departure from 
Tampa was delayed by the fact that he had 
little in the way of transportation to get him 
and his command to southern Florida. Jesup, 
whose office as Quartermaster General of 
the Army was responsible for getting 
supplies to the armies in the field, fumed at 
the constant delays his command suffered 
during the early part of the campaign. The 
commander's correspondence throughout 
this campaign is filled with urgent requests 
for supplies: "Sir, Send forward to this place 
[Fort Lane] without delay, the boats which I 
directed some time ago. I mean barges or 
flats of the second size. The movement of 
the troops will be greatly embarrassed if 
they should not arrive, had they been sent up 
when I requested them they could have been 
sent forward with forage yesterday."21 Basic 
necessities, such as shoes and other articles 
of clothing were often lacking or not 
forwarded to the frontier soon enough. In 
one notable incident, the lack of shoes 
greatly delayed the posting of nearly four 
hundred troops because the saw palmetto 
had disabled some of the men and the 
General refused to move them further south 
until the articles needed were supplied.22 
Always aware of the men's morale, Jesup 
found it intolerable that other consurnables 
were lacking or of such poor quality that 
they were unfit for use, even by the regular 
troops: "Greatly to my surprise," he wrote 
on December 29, 1837; "on my return to this 
post yesterday, I ascertained that there was 
neither sugar or coffee here for the troops. 
This is a most unpardonable neglect of some 
officer of the Commissarys Department. 
Report, without delay, the cause of this 
neglect.... The Beans sent to the Army are 
utterly unfit for issue, if you send any of 
them send those that are fresh."23 Delays in 
troop movement, improperly packaged 
supplies, not enough equipment for the 
forward posts, lack of transportation 
facilities and a myriad amount of other 
factors caused Jesup great worry and may be 
one of the more important reasons in the 
failure of the campaign. 
 
Jesup did, however, have some ability to 
adapt and adjust, as when he advised 
Colonel Taylor to improvise in constructing 
boats needed to explore the Kissimmee 
chain of lakes. As Jesup advised: 
 
I am induced [illegible word] from 
information received from the Indians 
and others, that the chain of Lakes 
extending from Tohopkaliga to Pahai 
Okee may be navigated by macinac 
boats, if not by those of larger size. 
Should we find this to be the fact, 
supplies may be taken from Tampa to 
the eastern side of the Okee chobee. (It 
is doubtful whether wagons or even 
packhorses can be taken to that point 
from this side.) I will thank you to cause 
a reconnaissance of those lakes to be 
made as far at least as the last named, 
and if you find them navigable, cause 
boats to be built, or brought from 
Tampa, to be employed as transport on 
them. Boat builders might be taken out 
to Fort Gardner and the boats 
constructed there. Canoes of Cypress 
enlarged by sawing them through the 
center from end to end, and widening 
them by inserting timber between the 
parts, in the manner of the fishing boats 
used on Our bay, would be well adapted 
to the service we shall have to perform. 
If the Lakes are navigable, and boats can 
either be built on them or brought from 
Tampa, the war may be certainly closed 
this winter.24 
 
The innovation to be noted is, "in the 
manner of the fishing boats used on Our 
bay." Here Jesup is describing the 
"Chesapeake Bay Log Canoe" which was 
constructed in just the manner described by 
the General. Jesup was very familiar with 
the craft, having been in Washington D.C. 
for many years. The beauty of this vessel is 
its great carrying capacity with a light 
draught of water. By extending the craft 
outward, as described above, the 
displacement becomes such that the canoe 
can navigate in very shallow waters. This, of 
course, was perfect for the streams and some 
lakes of the Kissimmee chain and other 
areas covered by this campaign. Jesup’s long 
career in the army, in numerous frontier 
assignments and in many important theaters 
of war, made him aware of the need for such 
adaption.25 
While Jesup was making his way down the 
east side of the peninsula, Persifor Smith 
and his force were working their way up the 
Caloosahatchee River. His mission, as noted 
above, was to prevent the Indians from 
attaining refuge in the Big Cypress Swamp 
or from obtaining supplies from outside 
along the west coast. Jesup was optimistic 
about the possibility of ensnaring the enemy 
in the heart of the Everglades. Writing to 
Colonel Taylor in early 1838, he noted: "If 
Colonel Smith can prevent the enemy from 
passing to the West, or if he can place a few 
boats on the Okee Chobee, to unite with 
yours, or prevent the Indians from 
occupying the Islands and Cypress Swamps 
to the south of the Lake, I shall entertain no 
doubt of a sweep."26 On the same day of this 
letter, January 18, 1838, the General learned 
of Colonel Smith’s capturing Holatoochee 
and forty of his people, who, along with 
eighty other prisoners, were sent 
immediately to Tampa and thence to New 
Orleans.27 This capture made some national 
news because it coincided with the surrender 
of Jumper and his band to Colonel Taylor. 
Smith’s position was reported as "still 
westward of Col. Taylor."28 To assist Smith 
and Taylor in holding the Indians in the 
Everglades, a series of fortifications was 
established around the lake and along the 
coasts of Florida. From Smith’s forces came 
the establishment of Fort Center, on 
Fisheating Creek, Fort Deynaud, on the 
Caloosahatchee River, Fort Keais, on the 
northern edge of the Big Cypress Swamp, 
and Fort Poinsett, on Cape Sable, which was 
commanded by Colonel Thomas Lawson, 
best known as the Surgeon General of the 
Army. In regards to the latter post, Jesup 
declared: "A post at or near Cape Sable 
would hold the Indians in Check, and per-
haps compel them to retrace their steps."29 
The overall strategy of surrounding the 
Seminoles and their allies in the Everglades, 
destroying their crops, cutting off all pos-
sible outside supplies and forcing a final 
confrontation or surrender was well thought 
out and articulated, however, because of the 
problems of supplies and the elusiveness of 
Sam Jones’ and other bands, the concept 
failed in actual application. 
 
Jesup also had to manoeuvre in conjunction 
with negotiations headed by a delegation of 
Cherokee Indians, whose presence in Florida 
was an additional burden on the commander. 
Yet, though he appears to have had little 
faith in the results of the negotiations, 
General Jesup did participate in the 
attempted diplomacy. As he reported in late 
1837, he had met with the Cherokee 
delegation, arranged a meeting with 
Micanopy and other Seminole leaders, held 
a conference where surrenders were agreed 
to and seems to have acted in good faith 
with the government’s policy. But he had no 
faith in the Seminole leadership which, he 
believed, had little or no influence over most 
of the warring faction.30 Also, he insisted on 
getting his forces in the desired positions 
and having the supplies forwarded to them, 
in case the negotiations failed. In a letter to 
Secretary of War Poinsett, Jesup stated: 
"General Hernandez will turn Indian river 
with his mounted men, and pass the foot and 
supplies across. I shall not allow his 
operations, nor those of Colonel Taylor or 
General Smith, to be checked for a moment 
by the Seminole councils; and the delay of 
this column will be more than 
counterbalanced by the increased efficiency 
of its means."31 After a year of experience 
and frustration with negotiating with the en-
emy, the cautious General was not going to 
be lulled into complacency. 
 
Aside from the capture of Holatoochee and 
his band and the surrender of Jumper to 
Taylor, Jesup did not have the war wrapped 
up as he had planned. Many factors 
appeared to mitigate against a successful 
conclusion in early 1838. In a moment of 
frustration, he wrote: 
 
Providence seems to have taken the 
Seminoles under its special protection. I 
have learnt since I wrote to you, that a 
vessel loaded with Rice has lately 
wrecked near New River, and that the 
Indians had secured a great part of the 
Cargo, this will give them subsistence 
for some months to come. ... Act as you 
may think best for the service; and 
should approach Colo. Smith’s command 
give him such instructions as from your 
knowledge of the country and the en-
emy, you may consider proper, or unite 
his force with yours if in your opinion 
any important object can be obtained by 
it.32 
 
Indian cattle, too, proved to be something of 
a problem for the army, in that special 
attention was given to their capture or 
purchase. If the wide ranging cattle could be 
captured, killed or bought, the war would 
end sooner. The reports given throughout 
the campaign indicate that there were still 
substantial numbers of these food animals 
within procurement distance of the enemy at 
any time. As the General noted to Colonel 
Taylor: "It is of the utmost importance that 
all the Indian Cattle be taken from them, 
purchase all you can from the Indians and 
negroes who come in."33 Keeping supplies 
with which to carry on the war out of reach 
of the Indian enemy proved to be a difficult, 
if not impossible, task for Jesup’s forces. 
The very nature of the fertile Everglades, the 
free roaming cattle and hogs, the 
comparative plentitude of game and the 
occasional ship wreck all worked against the 
general’s scheme of depriving the enemy of 
supplies. 
 
The plans of the army were also frustrated 
by the constant barrage of intelligence, most 
of it rumor or reports from "escapees" and 
captives. The frequent references to reports 
of Indian locations and numbers, all 
differing from each other, shows how 
difficult it was to accurately pin-point the 
enemy’s camps. Reports like: "Aligator is on 
the west side of the Okee Chobee not more 
than one or two days march from Fort 
Deynaud, so says an Indian whom I have 
sent with a message to [illegible, although 
probably Halotoochee] urging him to go into 
the Fort."34 Or: "An Indian Negro who came 
into camp on the evening of the 9th 
informed me that several small parties of 
Indians had crossed the Okee Chobee in 
boats to the south west side, the same place, 
perhaps, where Captain Munroe destroyed 
the Canoes."35 Again: "An Indian who went 
to the head of New River for his family 
returned last evening, he reports that the 
Indians, where he left them, were making 
their way to a Pine Island a few miles from 
the swamp at the head of the north branch of 
New River."36 This constant stream of 
intelligence, though sometimes accurate, 
was often simple rumor and, maybe, even 
disinformation, to use the modern term. 
Good maps, too, were lacking. So uncertain 
of the exact location of Lake Okeechobee 
was John Lee Williams, that he did not 
include this vast inland sea on his famous 
map of 1837. The army’s lack of knowledge 
in this area was also well known. As Jesup 
explained to the secretary of war: "... the 
greater portion of their country was 
unexplored wilderness, of the interior of 
which we were as ignorant as of the interior 
of China. We exhibit, in our present contest, 
the first instance, perhaps, since the 
commencement of authentic history, of a 
nation employing an army to explore a 
country, (for we can do little more than 
explore it) or attempting to remove a band of 
savages from one unexplored wilderness to 
another."37 The lack of accurate intelligence 
was another major factor in the final failure 
of Jesup’s intricate plan of operation. 
 
Colonel Smith’s operations during this 
campaign were closely followed in the press 
and in the correspondence of his 
commander. On March 1, 1838, for 
example, Smith’s forces were reported to 
have surrounded "a large body of Indians, 
men, women, and children," on an island in 
the Everglades and that, taken in 
conjunction with the surrender of a large 
force of Indians and Negroes at Tampa and 
General Nelson’s success in central Florida, 
would soon lead to the close of the war.38 
On March 8, 1838, Smith was informed of 
the approval of his plan to head further south 
into the Everglades to campaign against the 
enemy supposed to be in that region.39 Six 
days later, Jesup informed Taylor that 
Smith’s medical officer, a Doctor Steincke, 
had left the command and that the Colonel 
had no other medical officer under his 
command. Jesup ordered Taylor to supply 
one if it were in his power to do so.40 In 
nearly every report of the expedition of 
Taylor’s force reported in the media, Smith’s 
contingent was mentioned, with the 
exception of the debate over the Battle of 
Lake Okeechobee, in which Smith’s forces 
did not participate. 
 
In reporting the progress of his campaign, 
Persifor Smith, stated that he had left Fort 
Deynaud and moved south on March 7th 
with a company of Second Dragoons, a 
battalion of Second Infantry, marines under 
Captain Dulany and his own Louisiana 
volunteers, with the exception of one 
company he had left to garrison Fort Center. 
On the edge of the Big Cypress Swamp: "I 
erected on this spot, which is about 35 miles 
S. by E. from Fort Deynaud a small work in 
which I placed 20 days rations & one compy 
of La. Volunteers, naming the work, until 
the General’s pleasure is known, after one of 
the officers who fell with Major 
Dade.[Keais] This point is on the border of 
the great Cypress Swamp & within miles of 
the point where I found an Indian trail 
entering it, when I was here on the 26th 
Feby. our wagons could not well approach it 
nearer." His men then took with them five 
days rations upon their backs and proceeded 
to enter the swamp. After "incredible labour 
& fatigue, being all day Knee deep in water 
and mud & on wet prairies where the slimy 
surface is still more difficult," he searched 
for five days trying to locate the enemy. He 
was rewarded by finding a women and her 
child, who then negotiated with the others to 
come into Fort Keais or Fort Deynaud. 
Smith then led his men out of the swamp to 
await results. However, his description of 
the territory is worth noting to indicate the 
extreme difficulty of military operations in 
this region of Florida. 
 
The difficulties of this march through 
this part of the country are beyond all 
belief. No doubt the late rains have 
increased them, but even in the best sea-
son, troops must operate without any 
baggage but what they can carry on their 
backs, and in case of sickness, wounds 
or accident such as snake bites, the 
sufferers must be carried on the men’s 
shoulders, as we were obliged to do in 
the latter case, a litter could not be 
carried through some of the hammocks 
we passed. One prisoner said the large 
marsh we crossed was considered by the 
Indians impassable, and in fact we found 
no trail in that direction. But having 
never had any guide here we have got to 
be expert woodsmen. One prisoner was 
sent home by the route we came, on 
account of her children and the 
difficulties of the way.41 
 
The whole area, the valiant Colonel stated, 
was under water during the rainy season, 
making it impossible for campaigning. As 
General Jesup observed: "Colonel Smith has 
had a most arduous service. His operations 
are a further proof that the Indians can be 
concentrated by peaceful means only. . . ."42 
 
By April 16, 1838, Colonel Smith’s forces 
had had some relatively successful 
campaigning under their belts and he could 
report the gathering of one hundred and 
seven Indians for transport to Tampa and 
New Orleans. He noted in his report: "Some 
come in every day & a party of 25 or 30 are 
expected to day or tomorrow."43 By May, 
the number had increased to one hundred 
and twenty of the "Halvetochin tribe."44 
Prior to his leaving the area, he was to 
receive more prisoners, most of whom came 
into him at Fort Keais and Fort Deynaud. 
Once assembled, the prisoners were sent, via 
Peace River to Tampa and thence to New 
Orleans to await final transfer to the Indian 
Territory. 
 
Toward the end of March 1838, some of the 
troops under Smith’s command were at the 
end of their enlistments. This, of course, 
caused many adjustments in the plans of the 
high command, including the proposed 
abandonment of Fort Poinsett, on Cape 
Sable. Although this proposal was negated 
quickly, the fact of its planned abandonment 
gives an indication of how quickly 
adjustments had to be made because of the 
wide-spread use of volunteer forces with 
limited enlistment periods. Smith had to see 
that all arrangements for their transportation 
and mustering were in place and carried out. 
Some of the Philadelphia volunteers wanted 
to be discharged at Tampa, while others, 
particularly the Louisiana men, wished to be 
mustered out at New Orleans. These 
administrative details took up much time 
and concentration of the Colonel 
commanding and relied on the good 
communications between posts for their 
success. Overall, Persifor Smith carried out 
all phases of command, including those of a 
bureaucratic nature, with ability and 
humanity.45 
 
By the end of April, 1838, General Jesup 
was seeing the ultimate end of the Seminole 
War as something far removed from the 
actions of his troops. He saw that the 
Seminoles would never leave Florida unless 
forced by circumstances and overwhelming 
white numbers. He proposed that the area of 
southern Florida be left in Indian hands for 
the immediate future because the costs of 
removal, in money and men lost, would be 
too great. In essence, Jesup anticipated the 
actual course of events, including the 
reserving of lands in South Florida for 
Indian occupation. He even predicted the 
eventual passage of the Armed Occupation 
Act of 1842 when he noted: "I think a corps 
of Rangers should be raised in Florida of 
about six companies, . . . it should be raised 
for war, and each man should in addition to 
his pay and emoluments, be allowed a 
quarter section of land in receiving an 
honorable discharge after the termination of 
the war."46 He would later have the 
opportunity to help provide the provisions 
needed by the armed colonists. 
 
Persifor Smith’s troops had performed their 
duty well and honorably. Through the 
rugged terrain of southern Florida, they had 
trudged diligently and faithfully. No one 
could have asked for more from a volunteer 
force. In quoting the New Orleans 
Commercial Bulletin, the Army and Navy 
Chronicle described Smith’s return to 
Louisiana: 
 
The Soldier’s Return. — Our fellow 
citizen, Gen. Smith, after a rugged tour 
of duty through the swamps and 
savannahs of Florida, has returned to the 
bosom of his family, having reached our 
city on the night before last. [May 1, 
1838] He appears in fine health, though 
somewhat reduced in flesh, from the 
fatigues of the campaign. The scene of 
his military operations was confined to 
the southern and western territories of 
Florida, below Charlotte's Harbor, 
whither he was sent with a detachment 
of three hundred men in pursuit of a 
body of Indians. He hemmed in and 
drove the enemy to the extremity of the 
Peninsula, till they could fly no farther 
and were glad at length to sue for peace. 
After a talk with the chiefs, the whole 
Indian camp, amounting to two hundred 
and twelve in number, came in and 
surrendered themselves as prisoners of 
war. Having thus finished the campaign 
and the term of their enlistment having 
expired, Gen. Smith disbanded his forces 
and returned home, where he is greeted 
with the cordial welcome and high 
commendations which his arduous 
services rendered to the State so richly 
merit.47 
 
General Jesup had a less glowing account of 
the exploits of the Louisiana volunteer's 
contribution, although he noted a much 
higher figure of Indians taken prisoner: "His 
operations covered the whole country from 
that river [Caloosahatchee] south to Cape 
Sable. The results were one or two 
skirmishes, in which he lost a few men, 
probably killed some of the enemy, and took 
243 prisoners."48 
 
The Jesup campaign of t837-38 was an 
elaborately planned affair which deserved 
better results. However, It was plagued from 
the very beginning with poor coordination 
by the Commissary's Office, the almost total 
non-performance of certain suppliers, poor 
topographical information, the reliance upon 
large numbers of limited-service volunteer 
forces, including Smith's, and an impossible 
task of bringing to an end a war against a 
capable, resourceful and determined foe. 
Jesup was fortunate in having many able 
men in his ranks, too, including Smith, 
Colonel James Bankhead, Colonel Zachary 
Taylor, General Joseph Hernandez and 
many others whose ranks were lower, but 
whose names appear on the pages of history 
in a more famous conflict of the 1860s. 
 
Smith’s career after this second tour of duty 
in Florida, was one of exemplary service. He 
served with distinction on the benches of the 
city court of Lafayette and Jefferson Parish. 
His service in the Louisiana militia included 
a tern of office as adjutant general during the 
administration of Andre B. Roman.49 
Smith’s military service in the Mexican War 
brought him national attention and lasting 
fame. There, he again served under Zachary 
Taylor and, also, Winfield Scott, taking an 
active roll in both Generals’ campaigns and 
winning a brevet to Brigadier General. He 
was distinguished for his bravery in the 
Battle of Contreras and at Mexico City. He 
later served as the military governor of Vera 
Cruz in 1848. Persifor Smith was promoted 
to the brevetted rank of Major General in 
1849 and given the command of the 
Division of the Pacific. Later service in-
cluded commands of the Department of St. 
Louis and the Department of Utah, where he 
was put in command of a force preparing to 
put down the Mormon disturbances. He was 
given the full rank of Brigadier General in 
1856. While preparing to lead his men into 
Mormon territory, he died on May 17, 1858, 
at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Such was the 
man who led the Louisiana volunteers 
against the Seminoles of Florida from the 
army based at Fort Brooke, Tampa, Florida 
in 1837-38. He served us well. 
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